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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the simultaneousrelationship between
tax rates and city property tax basesusing data for 86 large U.S.
cities in 1967, 1972, 1977, and 1982.We find that a 10 percent
Increase in the city's property taxrate decreases the city's tax
base by about 1.5 percent. Inaddition, local income taxes and
taxes levied by overlying jurisidictjons(such as county and state
governments) also have negative impactson the city's property tax base. Local sales taxes, incontrast, appear to have little
impact. We conclude that taxes affect localproperty values more
than is typically implied byprevious studies that have investigated
the impacts of state and local taxeson firms' location decisions.
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City Taxes arid Property Tax Bases
Katharine L. Bradbury and Helen F. Ladd
The property tax has traditionally been and continues to be the major
revenue source of U.S. cities. Although cities have increasingly turned to
other local revenue sources such as sales and income taxes, they still rely
heavily on the local property tax to finance their local public expenditures.
Despite this, surprisingly little is known about the impact of a city's
property tax rate on its tax base.
Many local public officials apparently believe that property taxes have
significant adverse effects on city economic activity. Witness, for example,
their frequent willingness to grant tax abatements to encourage economic
investment in the city. Applied economists, in contrast, are nearly unanimous
in their skepticism both about the wisdom of such tax breaks and, more
fundamentally, about the magnitude of the adverse behavioral effects of state
and local taxes. Many empirical studies appear to support the contention that
differentials in state and local tax burdens are simply too small to offset
differences in the more basic determinants of firm location such as labor
costs and accessibility to markets. (See surveys by Case, Papke, and
Koenigsberg (1983); Kieschnik (1981); and Wasylemko (1981).)
Recent econometric investigations of the link between state and local
taxes and the location of economic activity fall into two categories. First
are those that focus on particular types of location decisions, typically the
branch plant decision which, one might argue, is the most likely to be
affected by taxes. (See, for example, Carlton (1979), Bartik (1985, 1986),
and Schmenner (1982).) This approach has the advantage of allowing the
researcher to ground the empirical analysis in the microeconomic theory offirm behavior. The second approach takes a much broader definition of
economic activity such as the level or change in employment or capital
investment either for all industries or certain industrial sectors. (See for
example, Papke (1986) who focuses on investment and Bradbury, Downs, and Small
(1982) who focus on changes in employment.) These more aggregate variables
are harder to model precisely because they reflect a variety of economic
decisions including, for example, the decision to expand, to shut down, to set
up a new branch plant, or to start a new firm.
Even if economists better understood the links between local taxes and the
location and expansion decisions of firms, they would still not be able to
answer the central question of this study, namely, what impact do local
property taxes have on the size of a city's property tax base? The difficulty
arises because the city tax base includes residential as well as business
property and because the market value of such property reflects not only the
intensity of economic development (the quantity of capital) but also location
rents, that is, the prices that firms and households are willing to pay to
invest in the central city rather than elsewhere. High property taxes may
reduce the size of the tax base either by reducing the level of business or
residential economic activity in the city or by being capitalized into lower
property values, or by some combination of both. Whatever the mechanism, city
officials and economists ought to care about the responsiveness of the city's
property tax base to the property tax rate. To the extent that the current
tax rate reduces the size of the base, the additional tax rate needed to
finance a given increase in public expenditures will be higher.
Other state and local taxes such as income or sales taxes may also affect
local property values despite their initial incidence on non—property factors
of production or on other economic transactions. Hence, a secondary goal of
this paper is to provide quantitative estimates of the effects of other state
—2—and local taxes on the size of a city's property tax base. Thisaspect of the
study can be viewed as the first step in a larger and more ambitious study
that would examine the effects of all major city taxes on each of thecity's
tax bases.
I. The Data and the Role of the Property Tax
Our empirical work focuses on the relationship between cityproperty taxes
and the market value of potentially taxable property in U.S. centralcities.
City governments, however, are often not alone in having thepower to levy
property taxes on the property located within city boundaries. In many
metropolitan areas, independent school districts, county governments, and
special districts are also authorized to tax city property if it falls within
their jurisdictional boundaries. Moreover, the economicactivity generated by
the city's property may be subject to state or local sales and incometaxes.
Regardless of whether they apply specifically to property or are levied by
overlying governments, all of these taxes (and the corresponding public
services they finance) could affect the size of a city's tax base.Hence, all
must be taken into account.
Our primary perspective, however, is the city government itself. Asan
independent decision—making entity, its decisions about local taxes can be
modeled more easily than could those of an aggregated set ofgovernmental
units. Hence, our goal is to measure the impact of cityproperty taxes on
city property tax bases, controlling for all other taxes thatmay affect the
amount of taxable property in the city.
The basic data are for 86 U.s. central cities for fouryears ——1967,
1972, 1977, and 1982. The 86 comprise all those American cities with
population over 300,000 in 1970 or 1980 plus all the central cities of the 50
largest SMSAs in either 1970 or 1980. Thus, the analysis includes all major
—3—central cities in the United States. The combined 1980 population of the 86
cities constitutes 21 percent of the 1980 U.S. population and 94 percent of
the U.S. population in central cities containing 50,000 or more people.
Property taxes are less important for city governments than for such other
types of local governments as counties and school districts, but they still
accounted for over half of the 1982 tax revenues of the average city in our
sample. Table 1, which provides information for the 79 cities with complete
revenue data for all four years, shows that reliance on the property tax
varies across cities of different sizes and across regions and that it
declined over time in all groups. Comparing cities grouped by size, cities
with population over 1 million relied least heavily on the property tax in
1967 and experienced the greatest decline in dependence in the succeeding 15
years. Of the six cities in this group, only Houston derived more than half
of its tax revenue from the property tax by 1982.
Cities in the Northeast began the period relying more heavily on the
property tax than cities in other parts of the country. Even in 1982, the
five New England cities still received 98—99 percent of their tax revenue from
the property tax. In contrast, cities in other parts of the country began the
period with more access to alternative taxes and increased their use of such
taxes during the period. Nationwide by 1982, 18 of the 86 cities derived some
revenue from local income or payroll taxes and all but nine cities relied on
general or selectives sales taxes to some degree.
Effective property tax rates, like dependence on the property tax, also
vary substantially across cities and generally declined over the 15—year
period. We define an effective tax rate as
t =T/B,
where T is the city's total revenues from the property tax, and B is the
market value of all potentially taxable property in the city. The tax base in
—4—Table 1
Property Taxes as Percent of All City Tax Revenues
Number
Cities by Group OfCities 1967 1972 1977 1982
All 79 69% 62% 59% 53%
Population Size:
Less than 100,000 6 95 91 89 91
100,000 —250,000 19 67 64 63 60
250,000 —500,000 30 65 57 52 46
500,000 —1,000,000 18 70 61 59 52
Greater than 1,000,000 6 63 53 49 40
Region:
Northeast 16 87 84 83 82
North Central 15 63 53 46 40
South 28 69 61 59 54
West 20 58 51 48 40
Note: Data are averages for the 79 cities in the sample that had complete
revenue data for all four years.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments and City
Government Finances.this measure is intended to be independent of how each city defines its tax
base in practice and to include all property other than that universally
exempt from the property tax such as churches and government buildings. Data
on property tax revenues are readily available from the Census of Governments,
but the market value of each city's potential tax base had to be estimated
from data on assessed values and assessment/sales ratios.1
To estimate tax bases, information from the Census of Governments was
supplemented with data gathered directly from cities. Nonetheless, some
missing values remain, especially for the earlier years. As a result,
information on tax bases is available for only 56 of the 86 cities for all
four years, but a total of about 280 city—year observations are available for
the pooled regression analysis reported below.
Table 2 shows the level and variation in effective tax rates for the 56
cities with complete information. The average rate decreased from 0.8 percent
in 1967 to 0.6 percent in 1982. (These rates may appear low, but they are
averages of city tax rates alone. The inclusion of property taxes levied by
overlying governments would raise the rates substantially in some cases.) The
table shows that tax rates are generally highest for the smallest and the
largest cities in the sample. This reflects heavy dependence on the property
tax relative to other revenue sources in the small cities and heavy overall
taxation in the large cities.
Among regions, rates in northeastern cities, especially those in New
England, are strikingly higher than those elsewhere. For the New England
cities, the high rates reflect a combination of heavy dependence on the
property tax and a concentration of revenue—raising responsibility (including
for schools and counties) at the municipal government level. In the West,
rates were low in 1967 and declined by one—half, on average, over the ensuing
fifteen years. This largely reflects the 1978 passage of Proposition 13,
—5—Table 2
Average Effective Property Tax Rates
(percent)
Number
Cities by Group OfCities 1967 1972 1977 1982
All 56 .83% .85% .80% .63%
Population Size:
Less than 100,000 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
100,000 —250,000 13 .95 .91 .85 .80
250,000 —500,000 22 .68 .66 .57 .44
500,000 —1,000,000 16 .92 1.00 1.01 .68
Greater than 1,000,000 5 .94 1.00 1.05 .85
Region:
Northeast 8 1.85 1.80 2.07 1.62
North Central 15 .54 .63 .57 .47
South 18 .94 .93 .78 .66
West 15 .45 .46 .39 .22
Notes: Averages shown for cities with data available in all four years.
Thirty of the 86 cities did not have complete property data for all four
years. The missing cities include all 11 in the sample with population under
100,000. Also left out of this table are 7 with population 100,000—250,000, 9
with population 250,000—500,000, and 2 and 1 in the two largest population
categories. Nine of the cities not reported in this table were located in the
Northeast, 12 in the South, and 9 in the West.
These effective property tax rates refer to city government property taxes
alone; see text for definition of effective property tax rate and sources.
Economic activity in these cities may also be subject to property taxes
imposed by independent school districts or county governments.which rolled back local property taxes in California and strengthened the tax
limitation movement in other states.
This wide variation in effective tax rates provides a natural experiment
for examining the hypothesis that city tax rates affect the attractiveness of
a city to households and firms and thereby directly influence the size of the
city's potential property tax base. Correspondingly wide variation in city
use of alternative revenue sources and in tax burdens imposed on city
residents by overlying jurisdictions also provide the information needed to
determine the effects of other taxes on city property tax bases.
II. Conceptual Framework
The relationship between the market value of a city's property per capita
(PBASE) and the city's property tax rate (t)isgiven by the expression
PBASE =f(t,X)
where X is a vector of exogenous variables, including public service levels,
that influence the size of the tax base. Estimating a relationship of this
form using ordinary least squares would not be a problem if the tax rate were
truly exogenous. This would be the case, for example, if state law mandated a
binding limit on the city's property tax rate. Perusal of the laws affecting
city property taxes, however, suggests that in most cases the property tax
rate, expressed as a fraction of full market value, is not exogenous. While
many cities are subject to tax limitations of some form, only rarely do these
limitations determine the effective tax rate. The clearest exceptions are
California cities in 1982 and Boston in 1982, each of which is subject to a
binding limit expressed in terms of an effective taxrate.2
More commonly, the local property tax rate is determined in part by the
size of the tax base. Consider, for example the following model of city
behavior. City government officials choose a level of expenditures in
—6—response to the demand of citizen voters for public services. They then levy
sufficientproperty taxes to pay for whatever portion of total expenditures
that they are unable to finance from other revenue sources. According to this
model, a higher tax base would lead to a lower tax rate for any given property
tax levy.
Assuming a log—linear specification of the tax base equation, we can
eliminate the resulting simultaneity by substituting the definitional
relationship t =PTAX/PBASE,where PTAX is per capita property tax revenues,
for t in the equation explaining the size of the base. Before the
substitution we have
(1) 1nPBASE=a-i.blnt+clnX+e,
where in denotes natural logarithm and e is a random error term. After
substituting for t and solving for PBASE, the equation becomes
(2) ln PBASE =a/(l+b)+ b/(l+b) in PTAX + cI(l+b) in X + e/(l+b).
Thus, treating property tax revenue, rather than the tax rate, as the
explanatory variable removes one source of the simultaneity problem, yet still
makes it possible to solve for b, the elasticity of the base withrespect to
the tax rate.
Even per capita tax revenue, however, may not be exogenous. A larger base
means that the same amount of revenues can be raised with a lower tax rate,
reducing the pain of raising taxes and thereby increasing the willingness of
voters to vote for higher taxes. (See later sections of the paper for further
discussion.) This endogeneity leads to the following two—equation model:
(3a) PBASE =g(PTAX,X) with ag/apTAx < 0
(3b) PTAX =h(PBASE,Z) with ah/apBAsE > 0
—7—where Z is a vector of exogenous variables that influence tax revenues. The
key to identifying the crucial coefficient of PTAX in equation 3a is that
there be good identifying variables, that is, that the vector Z include
variables that clearly belong in the revenue equation but not in the base
equation. One distinguishing characteristic of this study is the availability
of such variables.
The Tax Base Equation
The tax base equation includes tax revenues and three sets of exogenous
control variables in addition to year dummies. First are those that emerge
from a simple monocentric model of an urban economy. Second are those that
control for taxes other than municipal property taxes levied on economic
activity generated in the city and third are measures of public services. The
variables and reasons for including them are explained in the subsections that
follow. Table 3 reports their mnemonic variable names, definitions, means,
and standard deviations.
Variables Derived From an Urban Model. The starting point for the tax
base equation is a monocentric model of an urban economy. This strategy of
building on the descriptive implications of an urban model dramatically
simplifies what is in fact an enormously complicated and
not—very—well—understood problem, the behavioral modeling of economic activity
in an urban area.3 The following log—linear specification captures the
essential implications of the standard urban model for the total value of
property (B) per unit of land (LAND) in the portion of the metropolitan area
designated as the central city:
(4) (B/LAND) =f(SMPOP,LAND).
Controlling for the amount of land in the city, more activity in the
—8—Table 3
Variable Definitions and Means
(L denotes the natural logarithm)
Standard
Variable Definition Mean Deviation
Endogenous Variables
LPBASE Market value of potential property tax base 2.51 .40
per capita in thousands of 1972 dollars.
LPTAX Property tax revenues per capita in 1972 4.20 .76
dollars.
Variables in Both Equations
LPCY Per capita income of city residents in 1972 8.28 .13
dollars.
YR82 Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for
1982 and 0 otherwise.
YR77 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
1977 and 0 otherwise.
YR72 Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
1972 and 0 otherwise.
Other Variables in the Base Equation
LSMPOP Population in the city's Standard 7.10 .69
Metropolitan Statistical Area —inthousands
(1970, 1972, 1977, 1980)
LLAND Cityland area in square miles. 4.22 1.07
KEYCC Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for .70 .46
dominant central cities and 0 otherwise.
TRINC Statutory tax rate for city income, earnings .0035 .0086
or payroll tax.
TRSAL Statutory tax rate for city general sales .0060 .0086
tax.
LOVTAX Overlying tax burden per capita in 1972 5.86 .70
dollars.
LGEMP Government (all levels) employment per 2.56 .44
capita.Table 3 —continued
Standard
Variable Definition Mean Deviation
LCRIME Total crimes (both property and violent —1.78 .42
as reported in Uniform Crime Reports)
divided by private sector employees in
the city.
LFIRESER Total per capita state and local spending 2.41 .54
on fire protection in the city's state in
1972 dollars deflated by FCOST.
LMISCSER Total per capita state and local spending 5.70 .25
in the city's state on schools, health
and hospitals, and sewers and sanitation
in 1972 dollars deflated by MCOST.
Other Variables in Tax Eauation
LTSRI Total service responsibilities per capita 4.74 .59
in 1972 dollars.
AVINC Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if .18 .39
the city uses a local income, earnings, or
payroll taxandzero otherwise.
AVGSAL Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if .47 .50
the city uses a general sales tax and zero
otherwise.
AVSSAL Dummy variable that takesthevalue 1 if .87 .34
the city uses a selective sales tax and
zero otherwise.
ERPROP Export ratio for the property tax. .37 .11
ERINC Export ratio for the local income tax .073 .18
(0 if the tax is not used).
ERSAL Export ratio for the general sales tax .106 .15
(0 if the tax is not used).
MCOST Cost index for miscellaneous services 102. 23.
(Relative to 1972 average)
PCOST Cost index for police services 118. 79.
(Relative to 1972 average)
FCOST Cost index for fire services 120. 52.
(Relative to 1972 average)
LFAID Federal aid per capita in 1972 dollars. 3.04 1.55
LSTAID State aid per capita in 1972 dollars. 3.27 1.56metropolitan area as measured by metropolitan population (SMPOP) leads to a
higher value of property in the city per unit of city land. According to the
monocentric model, this occurs both because larger metropolitan areas have
higher land prices at the center and also because the higher price of land
induces more intensive economic development in the city in the form of
business and residential structures.
More city land, controlling for metropolitan population, is predicted to
reduce the value of property per unit of land; more land means that the city
extends further down the rent and density gradients of the metropolitan area.
Expressing the dependent variable in per capita terms rather than per unit
of land is more natural for the current empirical investigation. Hence, the
dependent variable in equation 4 must be multiplied by the inverse of the
population density (that is, by LAND/POP, where POP is the population of the
city). One approach at this point would be to add density (with a predicted
coefficient of —l in a log—linear specification) to the right hand side of the
equation. The difficulty here is that population density is endogenous in
that it, too, is determined by the exogenous determinants of land prices in
the city, namely SMPOP and LAND. Hence, including population density as an
exogenous variable in the estimating equation would not make sense. Instead,
we specify the reduced form of the model in log—linear form as
(5) in PBASE =a+c1in SMPOP +c2in LAND +e
where PBASE is the property tax base per capita and the coefficientsc1 and
c2 represent the combined effects of the exogenous variables on the base per
unit of land and on population density. Provided the population density
gradient is less affected by the exogenous variables than are the rent and
business density gradients, a positive sign for SMPOP and a negative sign for
LAND are still predicted.4
—9—The sample cities, and the metropolitan areas in which they are located,
vary in how well they I it the simple monocentric model. Of most concern is
that some of the central cities in the sample are not the primary centers of
economic activity in their respective SMSAs. Thus, for example, Everett WA,
with its 1982 population of 57,000, has far less claim to being the center of
the Seattle—Everett metropolitan area than does Seattle with 490,000
residents. To help control for such variations, an additional variable
(KEYCC) takes on the value one for those cities that dominate their SMSAs and
zero otherwise. Dominant cities are defined as the central city in SMSAs with
one central city and, somewhat arbitrarily, as those that have 60 percent or
more of either population or employment in SMSAs with two central cities or 50
percent or more in SMSAs with three central cities. Dominant central cities
are predicted to have larger tax bases per capita than do nondominant central
cities because of their positions as centers of urban economic activity.
Per capita income of city residents (PCY) completes the specification of
this part of the equation. This variable is expected to have a positive sign
because higher income increases the demand for housing.5
The property tax rate (t) is simply added to equation 5 in logarithmic
form with a coefficient of b, hypothesized to be negative. A higher property
tax rate is expected to reduce the value of the city's property tax base in
part because the land component of the tax will be capitalized into lower
property values. In addition, the improvements component of the tax is
expected to induce producers to shift away from capital toward labor and to
reduce the attractiveness of the city as a place for investing capital. The
reduced attractiveness of the city may manifest itself either in a change in
land prices or in reduced economic activity or, most likely, in some
combination of both. Following the logic of equation 2, the equation is then
respecified as a function of per capita property tax revenues (PTAX) to yield:
—10—(6) in PBASE =a+b/(i+b)in PTAX +ci/(l+b)in SMPOP
+c2/(i-i-b)in LAND +c3/(l+b)in KEYCC
n
+c/(l+b) in PCY +Zc /(1-i-b) X +e, 4 i=5 I i
where X ...Xare the other control variables in the tax base equation 5 n
discussed in the next two sections.
Nonproperty Tax Variables. Three additionai tax variables control for the
other taxes imposed on economic activity in central cities. Alternative taxes
levied by the city itself are represented in the tax base equation by
statutory city tax rates for income taxes (TRINC) and for general sales taxes
(TRSAL). Close to half the sample cities make no use of local general sales
6 taxes. In these cities the tax rate is zero.Only i8 of the 86 sample
cities had some form of a city income or payroll tax in 1982. Negative signs
are expected on both tax rate variables. A higher income tax rate lowers the
net—of—tax income of city residents, and may induce firms to pay higherwages
than they otherwise would, thereby reducing net profits and discouraging
investment in the city. This is predicted to reduce the demand forproperty
in the city except to the extent that the higher cost of labor induces firms
to substitute in favor of iand and capital. A higher sales tax ratemay
reduce the demand for taxed goods, and, similarly, lead to less investment in
the city.
The tremendous complexity and variation in the division of taxing
responsibilities among city and non—city governments across states makes it
impossible to control separately for each of the non—city taxes Imposed on
city economic activity. Instead, we constructed a single variable (OVTAX),
based on statewide data, as a proxy for the burden of overlying taxes. The
variable is calculated as the average state and local per capita tax burden in
the city's state multiplied by the "non—city" share of taxes in the state, and
—11—is based on the following logic. If the city itself imposed no taxes, all
residents (including residents of the city) could be viewed as being subject
to the average state and local tax burden in the state. But since each city's
major taxes (property, income, and sales) are modeled separately, city taxes
must be removed from the total state and local burden. This is accomplished
by using statewide data to subtract the average per capita taxes collected by
all those jurisdictions in the state that perform the same functions as the
city in question. Thus, for example, in constructing the overlying tax
variable for a city such as San Francisco which has responsibility for county
functions as well as municipal functions and hence has no overlying county,
care is taken to make sure that the calculated overlying burden does not
include county taxes.7 The expected sign of this variable is negative;
higher overlying tax burdens are likely to depress economic activity in the
city.
Measures of Public Services. Public services are an important component
of any study of the effects of state or local taxes. Since public services
are valued and taxes are used to pay for them, failure to control for services
could lead to incorrect estimates of the effects of taxes alone. In
principle, we need to control for all services available to city firms and
households regardless of whether the services are provided by the city
government itself or by some overlying government such as a state or county
government or an independent school district.
Public expenditures typically serve as the standard measure of public
services in studies of tax capitalization (e.g. Oates, 1969), but, as shown by
Rosen and Fullerton (1977), output measures such as educational test scores
are far superior. Hence, we have constructed three public service measures
that are intended to measure public sector outputs rather than simply public
inputs. The first is the number of crimes in the city expressed as a fraction
—12—of the city's total private sector employment (CRIME). Vocal public concern
about crime makes it plausible that the decision to invest in a particular
city might be influenced by the perceived risk of being assaulted or robbed.
Higher crime rates per worker in the city are predicted to lead to lower
property values.8 The second and third variables (FIRESER and MISCSER) are
proxies for fire protection and miscellaneous services (consisting of local
schools, sewers, sanitation, and health and hospitals) constructed from per
capita state and local expenditure data by state deflated by the estimated
costs of providing the respective service or sets of services in each city.
The cost indexes are designed to measure the effects of city—specific
environmental and demographic factors on the costs of providing a given
package of public services and are described in more detail below. To the
extent that the indexes correctly measure the costs per unit of final output,
deflating expenditures by them should lead to reasonable proxies for the level
of services actually available to city residents. We expect both variables to
enter the base equation with positive signs since higher service levels should
increase the size of a city's property tax base, ceteris paribus.
Year Dummies. The final three variables are year dummies (YR82, YR77, and
YR72). These dummies are needed in the pooled regression to control for
cyclical trends in the aggregate economy and for secular trends such as the
fall in transportation costs that tend to decentralize business activity.
The Property Tax Revenue Equation
Derivation of the property tax equation proceeds in two steps. First
comes the derivation of the demand for public services and second comes the
city's choice among revenue sources. This approach is consistent with the
view that the equilibrium amount of property taxes collected depends on
explicit choices by city officials. The basic structure of the estimating
equation follows from the identity
—13—I
(7) PTAX=( IE —OR)(PTAX/TTAX) i=l1.
I
where PTAX is property tax revenues,EEis all city operating expenditures
summed over I individual spending categories, OR is nontax exogenous revenues
such as lump sum intergovernmental aid, and TTAX is total revenues from all
local tax sources. For estimation, the variables derived from the two steps
are combined in a logarithmic equation with year dummies. The variables are
summarized in table 3.
Demand for Local Public Expenditures. The literature on local public
expenditures is well developed and needs only brief review here.9 The
typical starting point is that quantity demanded is a function of resident
income, per unit costs, and tax prices. Desired expenditure on the ith
expenditure category (Ei) is the product of costs and quantity demanded.
Hence,
(8) Ei =CjQ=f(Y, Cj, TS),
where Y is the income of the decisive voter, C is per unit cost of the ith
expenditure category, and TS is the decisive voter's share of the local tax
burden. The cost and tax share variables are entered separately because they
have different predicted impacts on total expenditures. Assuming a constant
price elasticity of b1 in the equation for quantity demanded, the coefficient
of the tax share variable in the expenditure equation is predicted to be bi
and consequently negative. The coefficient of the cost variable, however, is
predicted to be (l-fb), which will be positive unless the price elasticity
is larger (in the negative direction) than minus one.
Appropriately measured cost variables would reflect not only the costs of
inputs, but, following the logic of Bradford, Malt and Oates (1969), would
also incorporate the amount of intermediate goods such as police patrols that
—14—are needed to produce a given level of protection from crime. The idea here
is that environmental conditions in the city such as city density and the
incidence of poverty may affect the costs to the city of providing a given
level of the output, such as police protection, ultimately valued by city
residents. To reflect such cost variations, we have included three cost
indices for miscellaneous public services (MCOST), police protection services
(PCOST), and fire protection services (FCOST). The cost indices are derived
from a regression model that estimates the average impact on city expenditures
of each cost factor, controlling for other determinants of city spending such
as resident income and preferences)°
Given the purpose of this study, there is little need to be precise about
the identity of the decisive voter. The goal is simply to capture the
essentials of a basic expenditure model in order to think clearly about which
variables appropriately belong in the tax equation and can serve to identify
the coefficient of the property tax variable in the base equation. In the
estimated equations, per capita income (PCY) serves as a reasonable proxy of
the relevant income measure and is expected to have a positive effect on
taxes. The decisive voter's tax share is inversely proxied with a measure of
property tax exporting, which is also expected to influence the choice among
revenue sources, described in the next subsection of the paper.
As specified so far, desired expenditures are not explicitly dependent on
the size of the property tax base. This primarily reflects the simplicity of
the decisive voter model, particularly in its median voter form, rather than
economic reality. In more realistic models, the tax base or its components
might enter the expenditure equation for a variety of reasons. The value of
residential property, for example, might better proxy residents' permanent
income and, consequently, residents' willingness to pay for public services
than does current income. Or higher—valued property (whether residential or
—15—business) may require greater services in the form of protection from crime.
Or large amounts of business property relative to residential property in a
city may give business interests political power that can be used to convince
public officials to provide more services specifically for business or to keep
expenditures low to stabilize tax rates. Hence, using the simple model
presented in equation 8 to justify excluding the size of the property tax base
as an explanatory variable would be a mistake. Moreover, as discussed below,
the choice among revenue sources (the second stage of the derivation of the
tax equation) provides an additional justification for expecting the property
tax base to positively influence the level of property taxes.
The analysis to this point argues for including in the tax equation
standard determinants of the demand for spending on individual public
services: resident income, a tax share variable, service—specific measures of
costs, and the property tax base. One additional variable related to
expenditures dominates all the others in terms of its relevance to this study,
namely a measure of the services for which each city government in the sample
is responsible. Given the cross—sectional nature of the data set, variation
in service responsibilities is likely to be a primary determinant of the
variation in total expenditure. Stated differently, the number of expenditure
categories over which the summation applies in equation 7 varies substantially
among cities.
The variable measuring the total service responsibilities assigned to each
city (TSRI) indicates the per capita spending net of user charges that would
be required in each city to achieve national average per capita state—local
spending on each of 17 designated services, given the particular allocation of
spending responsibilities in each city's state. Constructed from statewide
rather than city—specific expenditure data, the measure avoids the potential
problem of attributing high service responsibilities to cities who choose to
—16—provide high service levels. The measure varies substantially across cities.
The most obvious variation relates to services such as elementary and
secondary education and municipal hospitals for which a city has either
complete spending responsibility or none. Some cities are also responsible
for services provided by counties elsewhere in their state. Variation across
states in the role of state government also accounts for a substantial portion
of the variation in service responsibilities across states. The greater the
state role in welfare, health, and corrections, the lower, in general, is the
11
city role.
Choice among Revenue Sources. Subtracting nontax exogenous revenues (OR
in equation 7) from total desired expenditures yields the amount of revenue
that must be raised from local tax sources. Nontax revenue is primarily
intergovernmental aid, but in principle, only the aid that is truly
exogenous. As measured, however, some of the per capita federal aid (FAID)
and per capita state aid (STAID) may be matching aid.
How the remaining revenue requirements are allocated among local tax
sources has received much less attention from economists than has the
expenditure decision.12 Consistent with the decisive voter approach, one
might hypothesize the following model of the city decision regarding how much
to rely on local property taxes:
(9) PTAX/TTAX= f(PBASE, Ày, ER)
where PBASE, as before is the per capita property tax base, AV is a vector of
dummy variables indicating the legal availability of alternative local taxes,
and ER is a vector of export ratios for alternative taxes.
The larger is the property tax base per person, the easier it should be
for the city to raise revenue through the property tax. A larger tax base
allows the city to raise a given amount of revenue with a lower tax rate and
—17—thereby to avoid the potentially distorting effects and heavy tax burdens of
high tax rates.
The legal availability of alternative revenue sources plays a key role in
the city tax decision given the stringent restrictions often placed on city
revenue—raising authority. As already noted, only 18 of the 86 sample cities
are currently allowed to use some form of local income or payroll tax, and 47
cities a general sales tax. A higher proportion of cities are permitted to
impose some form of selective sales tax. Availability of alternative tax
sources is likely to decrease a city's reliance on the local property tax.
Availability is indicated with dummy variables: AVINC refers to local income,
earnings, or payroll taxes; AVGSAL refers to the general sales tax; AVSSAL
refers to selective sales taxes.
Not all taxing instruments impose equal burdens on resident voters. A
portion of the burden of a local sales tax, for example, might be shifted onto
nonresident tourists and commuters in the form of higher prices. Or a payroll
tax may fall partially on nonresident commuters. Similarly, part of the
property tax burden may ultimately be borne by nonresidents in the form of
lower profits, higher prices, or lower wages. The export ratios (ER), defined
as the proportion of the tax burden associated with each of the major local
taxes that can be shifted to nonresidents, are included in the equation to
account for this burden shifting. The hypothesis is that local voters choose
taxes in such a way as to minimize burdens on themselves. Hence, a higher
export ratio for the property tax (ERPROP) is expected to lead to greater
reliance on property taxes, but higher export ratios for sales (ERSAL) or
income taxes (ERINC) are expected to reduce city reliance on property taxes.
The calculation of each export ratio relies first on assumptions about
which groups ——consumers,workers, or owners of property ——bearthe burden
of each tax and second on estimates of the proportion of each group that lives
—18—outside the city. The incidence assumptions arestraightforward for the
income and sales taxes; local income taxes are assumedto be borne fully by
workers in the form of lower wages and local salestaxes by consumers in the
form of higher prices. The incidence assumptions used forthe property tax
are much more complex and are spelled out elsewhere.'3 Calculatedexport
ratios for all three taxes vary substantiallyacross cities because of
differences in how cities define their tax bases, thediversity of city roles
in metropolitan areas, and variations in the mix ofshoppers, job—holders, or
property types across cities.
III. Estimation and Results
Table 4 shows the coefficients estimated usingtwo—stage least squares for
three equations: the tax base equation and two versionsof the tax equation.
The results correspond quite closely to expectations.
The Tax Base Equation —Results
The coefficient of primary interest, that of theproperty tax variable in
the base equation, is —0.13 and significantly differentfrom zero. Recalling
from equation 6 that this estimated coefficient isequal to (b/(l+b)), we
estimate the elasticity of the per capitaproperty tax base with respect to
the property tax rate (b) to be approximately —0.11.Thus, if the property
tax rate in one city were twice that of anothercity, per capita property
values would be expected to be 11 percent lower in thehigher tax city.
The three additional tax variables providesome interesting new insights
about the effects of alternative revenue sourceson the size of a city's
property tax base. The results imply that city income taxes and non—city
taxes both reduce the size of a city's tax base but, somewhatsurprisingly,




Independent Variable: Independent Variable:
Variables: LPBASE Variables: LPTAX
LPTAX _.13* LPBASE •57* .28
(.035) (.12) (.44)
LPCY 1.6* LPCY —— .58
(.15) (.86)
LSMPOP .16* LTSRI .71* .71*
(.034) (.055) (.053)
LLAND _.066* LMCOST .32* .33*
(.023) (.18) (.17)
IEYCC .11* LPCOST .063 .12
(.050) (.096) (.13)
TRTIC _l4* LFCOST .66* .63*
(2.9) (.15) (.15)
TRSAL 1.7 AVGSAL .29* _.27*
(2.3) (.076) (.076)
LOVTAX _.093* AVSSAL _.26*
(.034) (.083) (.080)
LCRIME —.065 AVINC —.31* •37*
(.059) (.10) (.13)
LFIRESER .052 ERINC _.92* _.82*
(.049) (.20) (.24)
LMISCSER _.19* ERSAL ..46*
(.10) (.25) (.25)
YR82 .20* ERPROP .027 .17
(.057) (.28) (.35)
YR77 .12* LFAID .0082 .0074
(.062) (.025) (.024)
YR72 .0095 LSTAID .081* .071*
(.057) (.024) (.028)
Constant _9.6* YR82 _•4Ø* _•35*
(1.4) (.10) (.13)
Adjusted YR77 .099 .13
R—squared = .50 (.12) (.12)





R—squared = .73 .75
Standard error .40 .38
*Coefficientsignificantly different from zero at 5% level, one—tailed test.
Notes: N=282; pooled time series and cross—section.
Estimated with two—stage least squares; LPBASE and LPTAX treated as endogenous.
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.the size of the base may not be surprising to business owners, many of whom
seem to prefer sales taxes over other state and local taxes on the grounds
that forward shifting of tax burdens to consumers keeps business firms from
bearing the burden of such taxes. To economists, however, the finding is
still somewhat surprising; reduced consumption in response to higher prices
would generally be expected to lead to some reduction in economic activity in
the city.
The coefficient of the overlying tax burden variable (LOVTAX) can be
interpreted directly as an elasticity once it has been multiplied by (l+b).
The coefficient of the income tax rate variable (TRINC) can be converted to an
elasticity evaluated at the mean income tax rate in the sample after
multiplying by (1-i-b). These calculations imply the following elasticities:
—.083 for overlying taxes and —.044for income taxes, both of which are the
same order of magnitude but, not surprisingly, smaller than the elasticity of
—.11 estimated for the property tax rate. The policy significance of the
relative sizes of these magnitudes is discussed later in the paper.
In contrast to the tax variables, the performance of the service variables
is somewhat disappointing. The crime rate and fire protection services enter
with the expected signs, but neither is statistically significant. Of more
concern is the negative sign on miscellaneous services. Why the quantity or
quality of services such as schools, health services, and sanitation should
lower property values is not clear. Measurement problems may be part of the
answer. Like the fire protection services variable, this measure is based on
statewide spending deflated by a local cost index. In the partial adjustment
model discussed later, the coefficient of miscellaneous services becomes
positive.
Each of the other estimated coefficients in the base equation must also be
multiplied by (1-i-b) =0.89to determine the value of the relevant
—20—elasticities. However, since the precise magnitudes of elasticities of per
capita property values with respect to the other variables are not the focus
of this paper, the reader should simply keep in mind that they are somewhat
smaller (in absolute value) than the coefficients shown in Table 4.
The variables derived from the urban monocentric model all perform as
expected. Cities in larger SMSAs have higher property values than those in
smaller SMSAs and cities with greater land areas have lower property values.
Moreover, because the dependent variable is expressed per capita rather than
per unit of land, the estimated coefficients imply that the impacts of SMSA
population and city land area on rent and business density gradients are
greater than on population density gradients. For example, the negative
coefficient of the land variable suggests not only that the market value of
property per unit of land is lower for larger cities (presumably because in
such cities the city extends further down the area's rent and density
gradients), but also that the lower property value per unit of land is not
offset by a sufficiently lower population density to produce a higher value of
property per resident.14
Also consistent with the predictions of the model are the findings that
dominant central cities have higher property values than secondary cities in
multi—centered SMSAs and that the per capita income of city residents is
strongly positively associated with city property values.
The Property Tax Revenue Equation —Results
The explanatory power of the tax equation as a whole is remarkably strong;
many variables not only show the expected signs, but also exhibit coefficients
significantly different from zero. The two versions of this equation shown in
Table 4 differ only in the exclusion of the per capita income of city
residents from the first equation.
—21—As discussed earlier, theoretical considerations argue for including both
per capita income and per capita property values in the estimating equation.
In practice, however, they are highly correlated, especially aftercontrolling
for other variables in the equations. Hence, identifying the independent
effect of the size of the property tax base on property tax revenues in this
pooled time—series cross—section is difficult. When income is included, the
coefficient of the base is indistinguishable from zero; when income is
excluded, the coefficient reflects the effects on property tax revenues of
both the property tax base and of the portion of resident income that is
correlated with property values across cities. No matter how it ismeasured,
however, ability—to—pay has a positive effect on revenue, which differs
significantly from zero. If one city has 10 percent more property per capita
than another city, the "combined" coefficient estimate implies that it will
raise 5.7 percent more tax revenues, other things (not includingincome)
equal, and that its property tax rate will be 4.3 percent lower.
A city's measured index of service responsibilities has astrongly
positive effect on tax revenues, as expected, and serves as a critical
variable identifying the tax variable in the base equation. Where the
"required bundle" of city services involves 10 percent more per capita
spending (at average costs), per capita property tax revenues are about 7
percent higher, on average, other things equal. Presumably the difference is
made up in service quality reductions or in additional revenues from other
sources. The three cost indexes are also positively associated with tax
revenues, indicating that in cities with higher production costs for local
public services, property taxes are also higher, other things equal.
The variables relating to taxes other than the property tax used by city
governments all exhibit statistically significant negative signs, as
expected. The negative coefficients on the dummy variables representing
—22—availability of specific nonproperty taxes indicate that cities tend to
substitute these other taxes for property taxes when they are allowed to use
them. Moreover, where the burdens of these nonproperty taxesfallless upon
local residents, cities depend upon them more heavily, as shown by the
negative signs on the income and sales tax export ratios. Also as predicted,
the coefficient of the property tax export ratio is positive, but it is not
significantly different from zero.
Intergovernmental aid from the federal government appears to have no
effect, while that from state government appears to exert a positive effect
on property tax revenues. This positive impact runs counter to the
expectation that intergovernmental transfers substitute for property tax
revenues, but might reflect reverse causation due either to matching
requirements or to distribution formulae that direct more aid to cities with
high property tax burdens. We attempted to purge the state and federal aid
variables of their possible endogeneity by using federal and state aid five
years earlier as instrumental variables, but the results were similar to those
reported in Table 4.
The coefficients on year dummy variables suggest that, controlling for
changes over time in the other included variables, per capita property tax
revenues (in constant dollars) expanded from 1967 to 1972 and then declined to
1982.
Cross—Section by Year
The basic structural model is generally robust over time. Estimating the
same tax base equation as shown in Table 4 (minus the year dummies) separately
for each of the four years yields signs and general patterns that are similar
across years, although some of the coefficients are estimated less precisely,
partly because the samples are smaller and partly because the quality of the
—23—data probably improved over time. An F—test of the complete equation does not
allow us to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients jointly are the same
over all four years and, hence, justifies pooling the four years of data into
one large sample.
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients by year of all the tax
variables in the base equation. The patterns are remarkably consistent across
years with the exception of 1972, for which year the coefficients of the
property tax variable and the overlying tax variable are surprisingly low.
Multicollinearity in this sample may be part of the problem; excluding the
miscellaneous service variable from the equation, for example, more than
doubles the absolute value of the coefficient of the property tax variable.
Overall, however, the results by year confirm the patterns from the pooled
data: negative effects on the property tax base of property taxes, income
taxes, and overlying taxes and positive (but insignificant) effects of sales
taxes.
Partial Adiustment Model
Researchers generally view coefficients from a cross—section regression as
estimates of long—run responses or elasticities, on the assumption that
differences between cities reflect equilibrium responses to differences in
underlying city characteristics. But over time, the land rents and intensity
of economic activity that determine city property values may not adjust
immediately to changing conditions. The availability of four years of data
for our cities, five years apart, allows us to incorporate this dynamic
behavior into the estimating equation and thereby provides an alternativeway
to estimate long—run elasticities.
Partial adjustment models start from the premise that economic actors in
any one period move only part way toward a long—run equilibrium. Thus, if
—24—Table 5
Single—Year Regression Results
Coefficients of TaxVariablesin Base Equation
1967 1972 1977 1982
LPT.AX _.l3* —.033 _.12* _.22*
(.073) (.059) (.068) (.074)
TRINC —8.6 —7.8 _16* _18*
(5.8) (6.0) (6.2) (5.2)
TRSAL 4.6 —1.5 3.1 2.9
(4.8) (4.7) (5.8) (4.7)
LOVTAX —.067 —.039 —.076 —.14*
(.056) (.067) (.075) (.081)
57 72 76 77
*Coefficient significantly different from zero at 5% level, one—tailed test.
Notes: Estimated with two—stage least squares; LPTAX treated as endogenous.
Other variables in system as shown in Table 4, excluding year dummies.
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.PBASE is the long—run equilibrium tax baseper capita in period t and
PBASEt and PBASEtthe actual bases per capita in periods t and t—l, then
in multiplicative form
(11) PBASEt/PBASEt_i =(PBASE/PBAsEt_l)A,
where A is the proportional adjustment occurring inone (five—year) period.
Taking natural logarithms yields:
(12) in PBASEt =Ain PBASE + (1—A) in PBASEt.....i.
Hence, the variables needed in the estimating equation are simply the
determinants of the equilibrium base PBASE, as before, plus thelagged
base, PBASEt1.
Estimates of the partial adjustment model are shown in Table6. The
second column reports coefficients estimated for the baseequation including
the lagged base, and the two final columnsreport estimated coefficients from
the corresponding tax equations. Lack of dataon property tax bases in 1962
limits these equations to the later threeyears of the study —1972,1977, and
1982. The first column reports estimates withno lags —thesame model as
shown in Table 4 but for the same threeyears as the partial adjustment model
—toprovide a consistent comparison of the two estimates oflong—run
responses.
The estimated coefficient on the lagged basevariable, 0.54, implies that
A is 0.46 and that slightly less than half of theadjustment to long run
equilibrium occurs during a five—year period. In the partialadjustment
framework, a long—run elasticity (that is, an elasticity of the equilibrium
base) with respect to any right—hand—side variable is equal to the estimated
coefficient shown in Table 6 divided by the estimate of A.Correcting also
for the substitution of tax revenues for taxrates, the long run elasticity of
—25—Table 6
Regression Results —PartialAdjustment Model
Dependent Variables: LPBASE Dependent Variable: LPTItX
Full
Independent Model Partial Independent Partial
Variables: No Lags Adjustment Variables: Adiustment
LPBASE—l —— •54* LPBASE •43* .27
(.056) (.13) (.21)
LPTAX _.14* —.083* LPCY —— .47
(.040) (.032) (.50)
LPCY 1.5* 0.95* LTSRI •73* .72*
(.17) (.16) (.064) (.064)
LSMPOP .17* .062* LMCOST .52* •45*
(.040) (.033) (.20) (.21)
LLAND _.052* —.026 LPCOST .12 .17
(.026) (.022) (.11) (.12)
KEYCC .12* .016 LFCOST •57* .56*
(.057) (.047) (.17) (.17)
TRINC _16* _8.4* AVGSAL _.27* _.27*
(3.3) (2.7) (.090) (.088)
TRSAL 1.8 .58 AVSSAL _45*
(2.8) (2.4) (.10) (.10)
LOVTAX —.096* —.055 AVINC —.31*
(.043) (.034) (.12) (.12)
LCRIME —.099 —.042 8RINC _•99* —.91*
(.070) (.060) (.25) (.26)
LFIRESER .061 —.0024 ERSAL —.52 —.46
(.058) (.046) (.36) (.36)
LMISCSER —.12 .098 ERPROP —.064 .042
(.12) (.097) (.35) (.36)
YR82 .21* .064 LFAID .0063 .0034
(.051) (.043) (.037) (.036)
YR77 .11* .025 LSTAID .081* .080*
(.049) (.041) (.030) (.029)
Constant _95* _7.0* YR82 54* _•53*
(1.6) (1.4) (.082) (.081)
YR77 —.075 —.070
Adjusted (.081) (.080)




error = .29 .22
Adjusted
R—squared = .74 .75
Standard
error = .40 .39
*Coefficientsignificantly different from zero at 5% level, one—tailed test.
Notes: Pooled time series and cross—section using data for 1972, 1977, and 1982;
N =202except in "no lags" model where N =225.
Estimated with two—stage least squares; LPTAX and LPSASE treated as endogeflOus.
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.
LPBASE—l is LPBASE lagged one period (five years).the base with respect to the property tax rate isapproximately equal to
—0.15, somewhat higher than the —0.12 estimate implied by the equation withno
lags. Both of these estimates are greater (in absolute value) than the—.11
derived from the comparable equation shown in table 4,presumably because the
year 1982, when the elasticity was more negative, is given more weight.
Although the reported coefficients of many of the other variablesare
smaller in the partial adjustment equation than in the equation withno lags,
dividing by X (=0.46) to derive estimates of long—run elasticities restores
most to comparable or larger size. Including the lagged base has the
advantage that it nets out a variety of inter—city differences notcaptured in
the other included variables and thereby controls forspecial factors in each
city that might otherwise lead to biased estimates of long—run elasticities.
One not very surprising result of this is that the roles ofsome of the
descriptive variables such as KEYCC and LSMPOP are reduced. These variables
do not change much over time and their predicted effectson the tax base may
operate through the lagged base variable in the partial adjustmentequation.
The coefficients of variables representing public services availableto
city residents appear to be quite sensitive to the inclusion of thelagged
base term. The measures of crime and of miscellaneous servicesnow both enter
with the predicted signs, although with relativelylarge standard errors.
This provides some support, albeit weak, for the conclusionthat higher crime
rates reduce property values and that higher miscellaneous services suchas
education and sanitation increase property values in the city. Ourproxy for
fire protection services enters with an unexpected negativesign but its
coefficient is virtually zero.
The results for the tax equation are similar to those reported in Table
4. Even with lagged base as an additional instrument, we stillcannot
identify separate effects for base and income. The elasticity of tax revenues
—26—with respect to the tax base (when income is excluded) is smaller than the
earlier results suggested —closerto 0.4 than to 0.6, indicating that a city
with a per capita tax base 10 percent above average would probably enjoy a tax
rate 6 percent below average.
IV. Interpretation: The Effects of Taxes on City Property Tax Bases
Our best estimate of the long—run elasticity of a city's property tax base
with respect to its tax rate is —0.15. We prefer this estimate from the
partial adjustment model because it explicitly allows for the dynamics of
property market adjustments over time and controls for city—specific effects
that might otherwise bias the coefficients. The estimated response appears to
be well identified in a statistical sense thanks to the nature of the data
base and the attention devoted to the specification of the revenue equation as
well as to the base equation. Moreover, the elasticity emerges from a set of
two equations that yield reasonable coefficients for almost all the other
variables suggested by economic theory.
How reasonable is the preferred estimate? In the absence of comparable
studies, one approach is to evaluate it with reference to the theory of
capitalization. Consider, for example, what would happen if property tax
rates were fully capitalized into property values. By way of illustration,
consider a parcel of property worth $100,000 and subject to a 0.8 percent tax
rate, the average city's rate in the sample. Then consider the change in
value predicted to occur with a 10 percent increase in the tax rate, to 0.88
percent. Assuming the resulting $80 tax increase were expected to continue
indefinitely, full capitalization would lead to a 1.5 percent reduction in the
value of the property (as our equation predicts) provided the relevant
interest rate were 5.3 percent (since $80/0.053 =$1500=1.5percent of
$100,000). Thus, at an interest rate of 5.3 percent, the estimated long run
—27—elasticity of —0.15 would be fully consistent with 100percent
capitalization. For higher interest rates, the estimatedelasticity indicates
a larger impact than would be implied by capitalizationalone and for lower
rates, it indicates a smaller impact.
Even if one were sure that the relevant interestrate were exactly 5.3
percent, it would be incorrect to interpret our results as evidence that
property taxes are fully capitalized into values. In contrast toprevious
studies that explicitly measure capitalization(e.g. Oates, 1969), we
purposely do not control for the amount of capital in the city.Hence the
estimated response of property values probablyrepresents the combined effects
of some capitalization (price change) andsome physical disinvestment in the
city (change in the quantity of capital). That is,part of the reduction in
the base probably represents the decision ofsome potential residents
(households and firms) not to move into thecity, the decision of some firms
to let their city property depreciate as they investelsewhere, and the
decision of some city residents to disinvest in theirresidential structures
by reducing maintenance. This decrease in investmentoccurs simultaneously
with a fall in the price of city land andstops once the after—tax rate of
return to investment is again equalized across jurisdictions.
As noted earlier, this study provides new evidencethat taxes other than
city property taxes also affect the size of a city'sproperty tax base. The
one exception is local sales taxes whichappear to have essentially no effect
on the property tax base. Table 7 compares the effects ofthe various taxes,
using the coefficients from the partial adjustmentequation. The entries in
the first column show the impact on the logarithmof the property tax base of
a 10 percent increase in a particular tax rateor, equivalently for
nonproperty taxes, in tax revenues. As changes in logarithms, the entries
(multiplied by 100) can be interpreted as percentagechanges in the base.
—28—Table 7
Impacts on the Property Tax Base
(By Type of Tax)
Property Tax —.015 —.014 or —•020b
City Income Tax —.0054 —.026




Notes: Entries are predicted impacts on the natural logarithm of the
per capita property tax base. When multiplied by 100 they can be
interpreted as percentage changes in the tax base. Calculated from
estimated coefficients from the partial adjustment equation shown in
Table 6.
a1972 dollars.
bThe first entry was evaluated at the average tax base and tax rate




Rate or Tax Revenues
$10 Per Capitaa
Increase in TaxesThus, a 10 percent increase in the property tax rate is predicted to reduce
the base by 1.5 percent, while a 10 percent increase in the local income tax
rate is predicted to reduce the base by only 0.5 percent. The estimated
impact of a 10 percent increase in overlying taxes is a 1.0 percent decline in
the base, halfway between the impacts of local income and property taxes.
These findings have two clear implications. First, a 10 percent increase ina
city's property tax rate will produce only an 8.5 percent increase in property
tax revenues on average in the long run. Second, increases in city income tax
rates or in taxes levied by overlying jurisdictions such as state and county
governments will reduce the property tax revenues collected with a given
property tax rate.
Policymakers should also be interested in the second column of Table 7
which shows the impact on the (logarithm of the) property tax base of a $10
increase in per capita tax revenues from each source. The two entries for the
property tax reflect evaluation at different averages. The 1.4 percent
decline was evaluated at the average property tax rate and tax base in the
sample, while the 2.0 percent decline was evaluated at the average per capita
tax revenues in the sample.
Surprisingly, the calculations indicate that a $10 increase in local
income taxes reduces the size of the property tax base by more than does a
comparable per capita increase in property taxes on average. This finding is
easily reconcilable with the apparently contradictory results in column 1: a
$10 per capita increase in revenue from income taxes requires a much larger
percentage increase in income tax rates than does a $10 increase in property
tax revenues, at current average rates in the sample. The larger Impact of
raising revenue through the income tax has important implications for
policymakers trying to reduce property tax burdens by substituting income
taxes for property taxes. Assuming constant total tax revenue and after
—29—allowing time for all adjustments, we find that the net effect of shifting
away from property taxes toward income taxes is to reduce the size of the
property tax base. Shifting away from property taxes in favor of local sales
taxes, in contrast, is estimated to increase the size of the local property
tax base.
An alternative way for local officials to reduce property taxesisto
induce higher levels of government to take over some of the city's service
responsibilities and to finance them by higher noncity taxes. Our estimates
suggest that this shift would increase the size of the city's property tax
base. Reducing property taxes by $10 per capita would increase the tax base
by 1.4 to 2.0 percent, an increase that more than offsets the much smaller
decrease of 0.3 percent associated with the $10 increase in the overlying tax
15 burden on city residents and firms.
IV. Conclusion
We began this paper with reference to the many studies that conclude that
state and local taxes do not matter in determining levels of economic activity
in cities. The results of this study indicate, quite to the contrary, that
taxes do matter. We find not only that cities with higher property tax rates
have lower property tax bases, but in addition that cities whose taxpayers are
subject to other taxes such as local income taxes and taxes levied by
overlying jurisdictions have lower property tax bases. These effects are
important because lower property tax bases require higher local property tax
rates to finance a given package of public services.
—30—Footnotes
1-Values of locally—assessed taxable andexempt real and personal
property, and state—assessed property, were combined. Because personal
property is partially or completely exempt from property taxation inmany
states, the reported "exempt" values for personalty were generally
incomplete. Personal property values were imputed for most cities basedon
their commercial and industrial real property values and therelationship
between personal property values and commercial and industrialreal property
values in those cities fully taxing personalproperty.
2This means that the equation modelingtax revenues (discussed below) is
less appropriate for Boston and the California cities in 1982than for other
cities. But deleting these observations does not affect thecoefficient
estimates.
3See Bradbury, Downs, and Small (1982) foran attempt to model the
simultaneous determination of city population,employment, and per capita
income.
4More precisely, we have
in (B/LAND) =b0+b1in SMPOP +b2in LAND +eand
in (POP/LAND) =d0+d1in SMPOP+d2in LAND +ii,
sothat
in (B/POP) =(b0—d0)+(bj—d1)in SMPOP +(b2—d2)
in LAND +(e—u).
Hence, c1 should be interpreted as b1—d1 andc2 as b2—d2.
5This prediction should not be confused withthe more ambiguous effects
of income that typically emerge from an urban model.According to that model,
household income of the residents of a metropolitanarea exerts two opposing
forces on the slope of the price gradient. On theone hand, higher income
increases the demand for space, which tends to flatten thegradient. On the
other, higher income increases the value of travel time andthereby raises the
cost of transportation which leads to steeper gradients, With therelevant
variable specified as the per capita income of city residentsalone, the
effects of income on city vs. suburban location arealready accounted for and
the issue becomes solely one of the demand forhousing services.
6Statutory rates for cities imposing a sales taxwere pieced together
from a variety of sources. The four main sourcesare the Commerce Clearing
House, State Tax Guide; John Due and John Mikesell, (1983); John Due(i97?)
and Advisory Commission on IntergovernmentalRelations, Significant Features
of Fiscal Federalism, various years.
7The estimated overlying tax burden for allother California cities in
the sample exceeds that for San Francisco, because they all haveoverlying
counties. See Helen F. Ladd, John Yinger et al. (1986), ch.8, for a complete
discussion of the complexities of calculating measures ofoverlying tax
burdens in a slightly different context.8Previous studies have shown that higher crime rates reduce housing
values. See, for example, Rizzo (1979) and Gray and Joelson (1979). We have
normalized the number of crimes (both property and violent crimes as reported
in The Uniform Crime Reports) by employees rather than by city population
because crimes rates per resident appear to be strongly correlated with the
amount of a city's nonresidential activity, especially commercial activity.
Hence, normalizing by resident population rather than by employees would lead
to a severe reverse causation problem; higher tax bases per capita would be
associated with higher crime rates per capita.
9See, for example, T. Bergstrom and R. Goodman (1973); and
T. Borcherding and R. Deacon (1972).
-0For a complete description of the basic methodology, see Ladd, Yinger
et al. (1986). A similar methodology based on Massachusetts communities is
described in K. Bradbury et al. (1984).
11For a complete derivation and discussion of this measure, see chapter
9 in H.F. Ladd, J. Yinger et al. (1986).
'2One notable exception is Robert P. Inman(1982).
13See Bradbury and Ladd (1985).
]-4That is, (b1—d1) and (b2—d2) from footnote 4 are positive.
]-5Furthermore, if it typically costs the city more on a per capita basis
to provide the shifted service than it costs other municipalities within the
jurisdiction assuming the responsibility, overlying taxes may rise by less
than $10 per capita; hence, the net increase in the property tax base may be
slightly greater.References
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